Marshall's case for competence-as-foundation is Napoleon, born 1769, promoted to Brigadier General at the age of 24. When he took command of France's Army of Italy, it was in disarray — soldiers undisciplined, unpaid, looting, short on ammunition and even shoes. His rise did not start with brilliant maneuvers. It started with logistics: he got the soldiers shoes, secured their wages, found ammunition and food, improved sanitation, and dismissed unruly and incompetent officers. Then he simply out-worked his adversaries — planned more, did more reconnaissance, engaged in more diplomacy, trained more, marched more. Fixing these basic, unglamorous problems produced a better fighting force, which produced victories, which produced momentum and morale — and more victories. There was no particular magic to it, though the effects were dramatic. The fall mirrors the rise. As his structural advantages eroded, late-career Napoleon leaned on genius and brilliance instead of competence, just as his enemies finally became competent. Marshall: competence, mere competence, explains the majority of both Napoleon's rise and his fall. Cross-domain: leadership, operations, turnarounds. --- *Source: [[Book Inventory/Progression|Progression]] (Sebastian Marshall, 2016) — Uncommon Virtues #1 — Mere Competence*